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Introduction
Hafner-Burton (2014) stresses the theoretically more ambiguous relationship between sanctions and the protection of human rights. On the one hand, sanctions can motivate concessions to improve human rights if a political regime is starved of the resources it needs to oppress disobedient groups within its population. On the other hand, sanctions may escalate a tense human rights situation if the population is incentivized to dissent and political leaders are deprived of the economic means to compensate them for their loyalty.
The extant empirical evidence tends to support the notion that economic sanctions are associated with a deterioration of human rights. Table A1 in the Appendix surveys 15 papers that empirically evaluate the effect of economic sanctions on the human rights situation and political transition in the target state. The majority of the studies report dispiriting results. The adverse economic shock on a country targeted by sanctions can motivate infringements of not only economic rights and political rights through confiscation of private property (Peksen 2016b ) and political repression (Peksen and Drury 2009; , but infringement of human rights as well (Escribà-Folch 2012; Peksen 2009; Wood 2008) . These effects appear to be the same for both broad and targeted sanctions (Carneiro and Apolinário 2015) . Moreover, sanctions may amplify discrimination against unprivileged groups in society, especially ethnic minorities (Peksen 2016a) . However, there are opposing findings as well. In contrast to Peksen and Drury (2010) , Soest and Wahman (2015) do not find any statistically significant relationship between economic sanctions in general and the degree of political repression. On the contrary, they report a positive association between sanctions aimed at promoting democratization and democratic transition. Moreover, Drury and Peksen (2014) provide results that indicate a positive effect of economic sanctions directed at improving a country's human rights situation, as well as women's political and economic rights.
The extant empirical literature not only exhibits contradictory results, but also contains several methodological drawbacks. First, the potential endogeneity of economic sanctions is ignored. In many cases, the imposition of economic sanctions is motivated by the existence of an unfavorable human rights situation, or coincides with political and social transition. Given this reality, taking the endogeneity of sanctions into account is of particular importance. Forty-eight percent (113 out of 235) of the countryyear observations in our sample of US imposed sanctions were justified because of the human rights situation in the target country. Second, empirical studies typically rely on single, narrowly defined indicators for a country's human rights situation. This limited perspective neglects the multi-dimensionality of human rights and the interdependence between these dimensions. Finally, the effect of sanctions on different measures of human rights (economic rights, political rights, basic human rights, and emancipatory rights) are tested separately using different empirical methods and specifications, making comparisons across studies very difficult.
This study offers a number of improvements to the literature dealing with the consequences of economic sanctions on human rights. First, we build upon a wellestablished political economy model to explain the political regime's reaction to economic shocks caused by the imposition of sanctions. Based on this theoretical framework, we derive empirically testable hypotheses linking economic sanctions to four different human rights dimensions; economic rights, political & civil rights, basic human rights, and emancipatory rights. Second, we evaluate the effect of US economic sanctions on each of these four human rights dimensions within a uniform empirical framework. To do so, we draw on two novel datasets that address human rights protection (Gutmann and Voigt 2015) and US economic sanctions (Neuenkirch and Neumeier 2015; . Third, we take the endogeneity of US economic sanctions into account by using endogenous treatment-regression models. More precisely, we use the potential target country's geographical distance from the US, as well as its voting alignment with the US in the UN General Assembly, as instruments for our sanctions indicator. In addition, we account for potential heterogeneity across sanctioned countries and non-sanctioned countries by allowing the parameters of our empirical model to differ across both groups. This flexibility gives us confidence that our estimates have a causal interpretation. Our key finding is that once the endogeneity of treatment assignment is accounted for, the adverse human rights consequences of sanctions expressed in significant parts of the literature are not supported by the data.
Emancipatory rights are, on average, even strengthened when a country faces sanctions imposed by the US.
Understanding the human rights consequences of economic sanctions is of fundamental importance for evaluating sanctions as a policy instrument. As noted by Simonen (2015, p. 192) : "The discussion, by the judiciary and by the general public, on human casualties and humanitarian suffering, in numbers, is an absolute necessity for the definition of what is acceptable damage in the light of various human rights commitments assumed by states."
In the next section, we develop our theoretical arguments and derive a set of hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data set and the methodology used to estimate causal average treatment effects. Section 4 discusses our empirical findings and Section 5 concludes.
Theoretical Considerations and Hypotheses

Economic Sanctions in the Acemoglu and Robinson Framework
We start this section by explaining how economic sanctions can be integrated into a standard political economy model as described by Acemoglu and Robinson (2006, hereafter A&R) . Such a model may give clear predictions regarding the direction of the effect that economic sanctions have on human rights protection in different dimensions.
In Section 2.2, we discuss possible consequences of sanctions for human rights beyond those considered in the A&R framework. The most important arguments in the literature are summarized and a set of hypotheses is derived for the empirical analysis.
Here we are particularly interested in the institutional consequences of two economic effects that have been linked to the use of economic sanctions: (1) An increase in poverty and income inequality in the target country (Choi and Luo 2013; Neuenkirch and Neumeier 2016) ; and (2) an adverse effect on economic growth (Hufbauer et al. 2009; Neuenkirch and Neumeier 2015) . These are the two essential economic effects of sanctions that have been established in the empirical literature. Next, we show how these effects translate into the A&R framework.
The political economy models of A&R start by assuming a stylized society that consists of two social groups, rich elites and poor citizens. The elites are the minority with 0 < δ < ½ describing their population share. For simplicity it is assumed that all members of a social group have the same income and that the income share of the elites θ (with 0 < θ < 1) is higher than that of the citizens, i.e., θ > δ. An increase in θ signifies an increase in inequality. Here we assume that the political process is best described by A&R's (2006) theory of non-democratic politics. Allen (2008a) has, for example, argued that 80% of all sanctions are directed against non-democracies. 1 Fully democratic countries are hardly ever targeted. As the elites are assumed to be in power, they can set a proportional income tax rate of 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1. The tax revenues are used to finance an equal lump-sum transfer to all members of society. The state serves only this purpose, that is, the redistribution of income between the members of society, which favors the citizens, who pay lower taxes and receive the same transfers. If the elites can choose, their preferred tax rate τ r = 0 is implemented, whereas the poor would like to implement τ p > 0. 2 Although the elites hold all de jure political power, the citizens have de facto power and influence political decision-making by virtue of their ability to organize a revolution, that is, overthrow and expropriate the elites. A&R (2006, p. 122 ) formulate a revolution constraint θ > μ, which specifies the condition under which the citizens prefer revolution over the status quo. It states that the benefits of a revolution outweigh the costs if the 1 In our sample, 195 out of 235 (78%) country-year observations where sanctions are in place belong to the group of countries that were non-democracies before the imposition of sanctions.
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Note that τ p is not simply 100%, since taxes are distortionary and these distortions increase overproportionally in the tax rate. elites do not credibly promise to improve the status quo of the citizens. The parameter μ expresses how costly a revolution would be in terms of the overall portion of a society's resources that would be destroyed in the process. μ depends on the revolution technology at the disposal of the citizens and their capacity to overcome the collective action problem, which is inherent in every revolution (Tullock 1971) . If income inequality (θ) rises sharply as a result of economic sanctions, the likelihood increases that the citizens will constitute a threat to the political regime. Analogously, it has been argued that negative income shocks help citizens coordinate resistance against the elites (e.g. A&R 2006, p. 31; Knutsen 2014) , thereby reducing μ. Allen (2008b) shows that antigovernment activities do increase under economic sanctions. Thus, the economic effects of imposing sanctions increase the conflict between citizens and elites. Marinov (2005) provides empirical evidence that sanctions also destabilize political leaders, although Licht (2015) finds the effect to be more moderate. Obviously, political leaders who take the threats caused by economic sanctions serious are acting appropriately.
In the models of A&R, the elites have three alternatives to deal with the threat of a revolution. They can redistribute resources just in the right amount to buy the loyalty of the citizens, or they can use repression, which may stop the citizens from revolting.
However, repression is costly and if it fails, revolution might ensue anyway. These two strategies are the key components of Wintrobe's (2000) political economy model of dictatorship. The choice between them is determined by their relative costliness and their effectiveness in preventing revolution. On average, an increase in inequality and decreasing growth rates due to sanctions will increase both redistribution and the use of repression, although individual countries may well rely primarily on one or the other of these two strategies.
The third alternative the elites may use to deal with the threat of revolution is to democratize. The central difference between democratization and setting the tax rate to τ p , which is the tax rate that would be preferred by the median voter in democracy, is the fact that democratization constitutes a durable institutional reform. After democratization the majority of the population, that is, the poor, can permanently set the tax rate. However, an increase in tax rates in non-democracy could be reversed quickly if the citizens no longer pose a threat of revolution. In other words, the elites cannot credibly commit to permanent redistributive policies as long as non-democratic institutions persist and the de facto political power of citizens is highly transitory. Given that democratization is an alternative to redistribution and repression, democratization should become more likely if a country is under economic sanctions. This, however, is only one side of the coin. Haggard and Kaufman (1995) stress that economic crises destabilize not only non-democratic, but also democratic regimes. They create a window of opportunity for the elites to overthrow a democratic government at relatively low cost. Likewise, high inequality is conducive to coups by the elites against a democratic regime, as more unequal democracies tend to be more redistributive. In conclusion, the A&R framework does not clearly show if democratic rights will on average be expanded or pushed back by economic sanctions.
The Effect of Economic Sanctions on Different Types of Human Rights
The preceding section outlined different rational political reactions to economic shocks caused by the imposition of sanctions. Next, we address the question of how these insights matter for the protection of four dimensions of human rights; economic rights, political & civil rights, basic human rights, and emancipatory rights. Beyond the expectations we can derive from the A&R framework, we also discuss complementary arguments from the literature and formulate testable hypotheses based on both.
One important effect of sanctions concerns economic rights. Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) argue that redistribution is the only way to address adverse economic shocks such as a decrease in per capita income and an increase in income inequality. In their model, this is done via proportional taxation and lump-sum transfers to the population.
In reality, redistribution is achieved not only by using monetary transfers, but also from government interference in economic rights. This type of interference is discussed in the literature on rent-seeking (Drezner 2011, p. 100; Krueger 1974) . Reduced property rights protection and other restrictions on economic liberties can be used to lower the risk of a revolution by appeasing the majority of the general population, or powerful groups within the population. As Peksen (2016b) points out, the ruling elite may not only overtly violate property rights and direct these violations against the political opposition, but they might also tacitly condone predatory actions of their key supporters by ignoring laws that protect private property. Pond (2015) claims that the negative effects of sanctions on economic liberties will persist even after sanctions are lifted, because industries shielded from international competition will lobby to maintain market entry barriers. While market interventions may shield citizens and politically connected business people from the adverse consequences of sanctions, politicians may use the scarcity created by sanctions to appropriate rents for themselves. Rowe (2001) , for example, explains how scarcity exacerbated by economic sanctions led the government of Rhodesia to organize a public distribution cartel for tobacco (see Kaempfer and Lowenberg (1999) for a more general discussion). Regrettably, the sorts of considerations articulated by political economy models are likely to be more significant than the insight that economies targeted by sanctions may need additional protections of economic rights to facilitate market adjustments.
H1: Economic sanctions have a negative effect on the level of economic rights in the target country.
As outlined in Section 2.1, the effect of economic sanctions on political and civil rights is ambiguous. On the one hand, a transfer of de jure political power to the citizens might be the ultima ratio to stop discontented citizens from revolting. On the other hand, governments targeted by economic sanctions face strong incentives to consolidate nondemocratic leadership. Thus, theoretically, either a democratic or a non-democratic transition may occur when sanctions are implemented and it is unclear which of the two effects prevails. Peksen and Drury (2009; disagree with this explanation derived from the A&R framework. They argue that opposition groups may gain momentum when the government is put under pressure by external actors and that the government will react by limiting political rights to signal its willingness to go against active political dissent. This effect is amplified if the grievances caused by sanctions lead to antigovernment violence. Although the argumentation of Peksen and Drury (2009) is somewhat contradictory (opposition groups, for example, are at the same time weakened and better mobilized due to sanctions), it highlights that the theoretical association between sanctions and political rights is evidently inconclusive. Oechslin (2014) introduces a political economy model to explain why sanctions may fail to bring about regime change. Soest and Wahman (2015) argue that sanctions specifically aimed at inducing democratic change, so-called democratic sanctions, may also lead to more extensive political liberties. Taking the above arguments together we arrive at two opposing hypotheses regarding the relationship between sanctions and political rights: In the A&R framework, a logical reaction of an incumbent regime to an increased revolutionary threat as a result of economic sanctions is the use of repression. Verwimp's (2003) political-economic analysis of the genocide in Rwanda shows how desperately a regime can react to threats resulting from economic hardship.
Furthermore, Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) argue that under asymmetric information about the elite's strength, the citizens might interpret economic concessions by the elites as a sign of weakness, which makes the use of repression relatively more attractive. Wood (2008) points out that a regime under economic sanctions may simply lack the necessary resources to placate its citizens and hence fall back on repressive measures. This, however, presupposes that repression is cheaper than buying loyalty. The use of repression as a response to economic sanctions may indeed be cheap, as they are perceived to be an external threat to national unity and could legitimize harsh reactions by the regime (Peksen 2009 ). A limitation of A&R's model (2006) is its emphasis on the rights of the economic elites and of the revolutionary threat posed by a well-organized majority of the population.
The question of what leads to (non-)discrimination against powerless minorities is outside the scope of their model (Mukand and Rodrik 2015) . The literature on the economics of discrimination suggests that discrimination, for example, in the labor market, is less costly for those who discriminate during economic downturns, as there will be a temporary excess supply of labor (see, e.g., Becker 1971). Drury and Peksen (2014) add the argument that economic grievances caused by sanctions lead to increased violations of women's rights. To make things worse, women are more likely employed in export-oriented industries, which are disproportionately affected by sanctions.
H4a: Economic sanctions have a negative effect on the level of women's rights in the target country.
If, however, economic conditions force non-working women to take up a job and contribute to the household income, the opposite effect regarding the rights of women could arise (the so-called added worker effect), which may lead to pressure against gender discrimination. Neumark and Postlewaite (1998) argue that the entry of some women could incentivize other women to also join the workforce. Alesina et al. (2013) show, in a very different context, that incentivized gender roles can have important consequences for the role of women in society. Doepke et al. (2012) summarize the literature on culture and women's rights as follows: "the ultimate cause of political reform was economic change that altered attitudes toward women" (p. 355). Geddes and Lueck (2002) offer a very straightforward explanation of the extension of women's rights based on property rights theory. When women's labor market opportunities improve, husbands initially hold all legal power but are unable to control the effort level exerted by women at work. The family income could, thus, be increased by endowing women with economic rights to incentivize them to exert higher effort.
Similarly, Bertocchi (2011) explains the extension of women's political rights by their labor market opportunities and the resulting reduction in the gender wage gap. If, as a consequence, the gap between the tax rates preferred by male and female voters declines, men are more likely to support the extension of women's political rights.
H4b: Economic sanctions have a positive effect on the level of women's rights in the target country.
Empirical Methodology and Data
Human Rights and Sanctions Indicators
As dependent variables, we employ four different human rights indicators. These come from a new dataset that measures human rights protection in four empirically Table 1 shows the varimax rotated factor loadings with Kaiser normalization as in Gutmann and Voigt (2015) .
The results of Gutmann and Voigt (2015) The concrete indicators are the following. Cingranelli and Richards (2010) ; disappearances, political or extrajudicial killings, political imprisonment, torture, freedom of assembly and association, freedom of domestic and foreign travel, freedom of speech, electoral self-determination, freedom of religion, workers' rights, and women's political, economic, and social rights. Freedom House (2014) ; political rights and civil liberties. Gwartney et al. (2014) ; freedom in the legal system and property rights, freedom to trade internationally, and freedom from regulation.
repressive policies, are often not even legal. Property rights, for example, could be improved or weakened by rewriting parts of the constitution (however, see Gutmann and Voigt (2013) for the limitations of such an approach), but increased expropriation could just as well be based on existing laws. In our analysis, we standardize the four components so that each of them has a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1 in order to facilitate the interpretation of our coefficient estimates. Gutmann and Voigt (2015) . Factor loadings are omitted if |loading|<0.25.
Our main explanatory variable, the sanction indicator, takes on the value 1 if a certain country i is subject to US economic sanctions in year t, and 0 otherwise. We rely on a unique dataset by Neuenkirch and Neumeier (2015) covering all US sanction episodes between 1976 and 2012. This dataset is an extension of the dataset by Hufbauer et al. (2009) . After adjusting the sample of Neuenkirch and Neumeier (2015) to the smaller human rights dataset of Gutmann and Voigt (2015) , we have 235 country-year observations with US sanctions in place. The countries included in our final dataset as well as the sanction episodes are listed in Table A2 in the Appendix. 
Estimation Strategy
In our empirical analysis, we consider the imposition of US economic sanctions as a treatment. Consequently, observations on countries in years in which sanctions were in effect represent our treatment group, while country-year observations without sanctions in place are the control group. Our goal is to estimate the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), which is defined as follows:
The first term on the right-hand side of Equation (1) represents the expected outcome in the treatment group after treatment ( = 1), the second term is the counterfactual outcome, that is, the expected outcome subjects in the treatment group would have achieved if treatment had not been assigned ( = 0). The problem is that the counterfactual outcome is not observable and, thus, a suitable substitute is required to compute the ATT. If treatment is assigned randomly, then the average outcome for units not exposed to treatment constitutes a proper substitute, as selection into the treatment group is not related to factors affecting the outcome variable of interest. The imposition of economic sanctions, though, is clearly not random, making the identification of the ATT difficult.
To account for the endogeneity of the treatment, and to evaluate the causal influence of US economic sanctions on the target states' respect for human rights, we employ an endogenous treatment model. Endogenous treatment models allow identification of the causal treatment effect if selection into treatment is based on unobservable factors that also affect the outcome of interest. Identification relies on the availability of at least one variable that is related to treatment assignment, but not directly to the outcome. 4 Suppose that the outcome for the treatment and control group, respectively, can be modelled by means of the following equations, which we refer to as the outcome model:
where is the outcome with treatment, is the outcome without treatment, and x is a vector of covariates that potentially explain the outcome for both the treatment and the control group.
It is important to note that the coefficients of the covariates collected in the vectors and are allowed to vary across Equations (2) and (3). Thus, our empirical approach is characterized by a great deal of flexibility as we account for potential heterogeneity across the treatment and control group with regard to the parameters of the outcome 4 The endogenous treatment model employed here was first introduced by Heckman (1976; 1978) . See Cameron and Trivedi (2005) for a thorough discussion.
model. That is, the effect of each covariate on the outcome may vary over the treatment and control group.
To account for the endogeneity of treatment assignment, Equations (2) and (3) To see how the endogeneity of treatment assignment affects the outcome of interest, it is helpful to take a look at the relation between the error terms of Equations (2) to (4).
Assume that the vector of error terms ( , , ) comes from a mean zero trivariate normal distribution and has the following covariance matrix:
Endogeneity of treatment occurs when the off-diagonal elements and are different from zero. In contrast, exogeneity of treatment implies that = 0 and = 0, i.e., the outcome of interest must not be related to unobservables affecting the likelihood of treatment assignment. measures the correlation between the treatment assignment errors and the outcome errors for the control group, the correlation between the treatment assignment errors and the outcome errors for the treatment group. Hence, these coefficients allow us to assess the importance of the selection effect on the outcome of interest. For example, a treatment group that has a negative (positive)
value for implies that unobservables that negatively affect a country's human rights situation tend to concur with unobservables that increase (decrease) the likelihood of being subject to US economic sanctions. For identification, the variance of is restricted to 1.
For the endogenous treatment model, the ATT is given by:
where (. ) and Ф(. ) represent the density function and the distribution function, respectively, of the standard normal distribution. Equation (5) illustrates that the size of the treatment effect depends on three factors: (i) the realizations of the covariates, i.e., the vector ; (ii) the heterogeneity of each covariate's effect on the outcome across the treatment and control group, i.e. ( − ); and (iii) the selection effect, denoted by the term ( − ) ( )/Ф( ). All parameters that need to be identified to compute the ATT can be estimated simultaneously by Maximum Likelihood (see Maddala (1983) for a formal derivation of the likelihood function).
In general, vector z of Equation (4) The endogenous treatment model employed in our empirical analysis is closely related to the regime-switching regression model as well as the Heckman selection model. Since the outcome equation is regime-dependent, i.e., it varies depending on whether the (endogenously determined) treatment is 'switched' on or off, the model depicted by
Equations (2) to (4) is also referred to as an endogenous switching regression model.
Further, the endogenous treatment model can be interpreted as a double sample selection problem (Clougherty et al. 2015: 298) , and one could alternatively estimate two separate Heckman selection models for the treated and untreated units. The main difference between estimating an endogenous treatment model versus two Heckman selection models is that in the latter approach, the parameter , i.e., the covariance between the error terms for the treated and untreated units, would be implicitly set to zero. Furthermore, the latter approach is less efficient, as only the subsample of the treated and untreated units, respectively, is used to identify the parameters of interest.
As a benchmark, we also use simple OLS regression to evaluate the influence of US economic sanctions on the targeted governments' respect for human rights. For this purpose, we estimate the following equation:
where the vector of covariates x is the same as in Equations (2) and (3). By comparing the findings from simple OLS regressions to those obtained from the endogenous treatment-regression model, we should be able to assess the importance of the endogeneity of the treatment for the results presented in the extant empirical literature.
Control Variables and Treatment Instruments
In our empirical analysis, the vector of covariates in the treatment model (vector z)
includes factors that we expect will affect the likelihood of being targeted by US economic sanctions. According to Hufbauer et al. (2009) (ii) to foster democratic change in a country, protect democracy, or destabilize an autocratic regime; and (iii) to protect the citizens of a state from political repression and enforce human rights. Consequently, we include lagged realizations of our human rights indicators into vector z. We also account for a country's level of democracy. Further, we take into account; (i) interstate armed conflicts, (ii) internal armed conflicts without intervention from other states, and (iii) internationalized internal armed conflicts with intervention from other states. For all three types of conflict we include separate dummy variables for minor conflicts and wars, respectively. Finally, we add US President-fixed effects to control for President-specific and time-specific influences such as differences with respect to the foreign policy stance across tenures of US Presidents (Reagan, Bush
Sr., Clinton, Bush Jr., and Obama) and also for changes in the global political environment (e.g., the fall of the Iron Curtain or the adoption of the Millennium Development Goals). 5
Vector x of the outcome model includes the same covariates just described for vector z.
Additionally, we consider lagged macroeconomic variables in the outcome model; real GDP per capita in logs, real GDP per capita growth rate, population in logs, trade openness (exports plus imports divided by GDP), trade share with the US (exports to, plus imports from, the US divided by the country's total exports plus imports), and the share of investment to GDP. Finally, we include year-fixed effects in vector x.
In our empirical analysis, we employ three treatment instruments to identify the ATT.
These variables are included in vector z, but not in vector x, because we believe that they do not directly affect the outcome variables of interest. First, we use the geographical distance between the capital of each country included in our sample and Washington, D.C. as a treatment instrument. There are several reasons to believe that countries that are close to the US are ceteris paribus more likely to be targets of US economic sanctions.
First, internal conflicts in a country that is close to the US may represent a greater threat to the US itself. These types of conflicts may also cause direct adverse consequences for the US, such as an impairment of economic relations (Martin et al. 2008) , or the danger of contagion (Weidmann and Ward 2010) . Moreover, human rights violations that cause safety-seeking refugee flows are more threatening to US interests when the country of origin is close to the United States (Nielsen 2013) . Second, the closer a country is to the US, the greater the awareness of its political and social situation among the general public in the US, thus increasing the pressure for US politics to intervene. Nielsen (2013), for example, shows that the likelihood of aid sanctions against repressive states increases with the level of media coverage. Peksen et al. (2014) find the same effect specifically for the imposition of US economic sanctions. Finally, sanctions may be considered more effective if the prospective target nation is close. Neuenkirch and Neumeier (2015) show that the magnitude of the adverse effect US economic sanctions have on the target state's GDP is inversely related to the target state's distance to the US.
Inasmuch as the US takes the expected effectiveness of its sanction measures into 5
The results based on our main specifications remain robust when replacing the US President-fixed effects with year-fixed effects. However, as part of our robustness checks, we reduce our sample to glean further insights. Due to the associated decrease in the degrees of freedom, some models do not converge when employing year-fixed effects in our treatment model. Table A3 in the Appendix summarizes all variables as well as their definitions and sources. Table A4 provides summary statistics and detailed information on episodes of economic sanctions or conflicts.
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We have also tested another treatment instrument. Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009) introduce a measure of genetic distance, which represents a summary statistic for divergence in implicit beliefs, customs, habits, biases, conventions, etc. The authors argue that similarity in such traits would facilitate communication and understanding between societies. However, genetic distance does not add significantly to explaining the imposition of US sanctions when it is included alongside geographical distance and voting distance in the UNGA. Thus, it is not employed hereafter.
Empirical Results
Baseline Results
The results for both the OLS regressions as well as the endogenous treatment model are shown in Tables The findings based on OLS estimation suggest that US economic sanctions have an adverse effect on the target state's respect for basic human rights as well as political rights and civil liberties. This finding holds across all four specifications and is well in line with the evidence provided by Peksen (2009) and Wood (2008) . In contrast, we do not find a significant association between economic sanctions and the level of economic rights and emancipatory rights. This finding stands in contrast to Peksen (2016b) , who finds a negative effect of sanctions on economic freedom in terms of property rights protection and the use of contract-intensive money. sanctions imposed by the US, the results from the endogenous treatment models lead us to reject hypotheses 2a and 3a. Given that after accounting for the endogeneity of selection into treatment, we only find a positive effect of US economic sanctions on emancipatory rights, we can conclude that our data does not support the widespread concern about adverse human rights consequences of US economic sanctions.
A glance at the coefficient estimates for our treatment covariates reveals that the geographical distance to Washington, D.C. is indeed strongly related to the likelihood of being targeted by US economic sanctions. Keeping in mind that the variables in the interaction term are centered at their means, the coefficient estimate suggests that, on average, a country close to the US is more likely to become subject to economic sanctions than a country far away. This effect appears to be significant at every reasonable level. The linear term of our indicator measuring voting alignment, however, is statistically insignificant, implying that the voting behavior of a country with an average distance from the US is not related to the likelihood of being hit by US sanctions.
However, the interaction term suggests that the effect of voting alignment on the likelihood of being targeted by economic sanctions varies with the geographical distance to the US (and vice versa). Countries with a distance of at least 8,398 kilometers are significantly more likely to be sanctioned if they do not vote in line with the US.
In three out of our four models, the negative estimates for and indicate that, in general, unobservables that adversely affect a country's human rights situation tend to follow a similar pattern as unobservables that increase the likelihood of being targeted by US economic sanctions, both in the treatment group as well as in the control group.
This finding further strengthens the evidence for the endogeneity of US economic sanctions: The set of control variables employed in the empirical analysis do not capture the differences between countries where sanctions are imposed and countries not subject to sanctions. An analysis of the effects of sanctions that ignores the endogeneity of US economic sanctions, thus, produces biased estimates. The only exception is the model in which the dependent variable measures economic rights. Here, both and are positive, yet of negligible size and not statistically different from zero.
Extensions
To glean additional insights, we differentiate between different types of US economic sanctions and estimate separate treatment effects. First, we evaluate the effect of mild versus moderate and severe economic sanctions. To this end, we omit all moderate or severe sanctions from our sample of country-year observations. That way, the coefficient estimate for our sanction indicator provides us with an estimate for the effect of mild economic sanctions. Then, we omit country-year observations with mild sanctions in place to obtain an estimate for the effect of moderate and severe sanctions. Table reproduces the estimates from Tables 2a-2d . In general, the results are well in line with those presented in the preceding section.
Our findings using the OLS estimates, suggest that the imposition of moderate/severe sanctions have a harsher effect on the level of political rights and civil liberties than mild sanctions, and that multilateral sanctions produce more severe effects than unilateral sanctions. Both findings appear to be well in line with the extant empirical evidence (Peksen and Drury 2010) . In addition, the negative effect of sanctions seems to decline over time. This result, arguably, could again reflect endogeneity; sanctions that are more effective tend to be lifted sooner. We get a somewhat different picture, however, when looking at the target countries' basic human rights situation. Here, the adverse effect of sanctions appears to be stronger for mild sanctions and unilateral sanctions. Moreover, the target government's respect for basic human rights decreases more notably when sanctions are imposed with the aim of actually improving the human rights situation. Yet again, we believe that this finding is indicative of a flaw in the extant empirical literature.
The inverse association between sanctions and the human rights situation may be driven by the fact that sanctions are imposed because of particular policies adopted by the incumbent regime that result in a deterioration of basic human rights.
The results based on the OLS regression do not hold in the context of our endogenous treatment model. Economic sanctions imposed by the US (irrespective of what sanction type is considered or how long they remain in effect) do not exert a significant causal influence on the target government's respect for basic human rights, political rights and civil liberties, or economic rights. Note that again, the lack of significance of our sanction indicators is not due to inefficient estimation. Rather, when taking the endogeneity of economic sanctions into account the coefficient estimates tend to noticeably decrease (in absolute terms) and come close to zero, indicating that the estimation bias based on the OLS regression is sizeable.
When we look at the effect of sanctions on the level of emancipatory rights, we find a stronger positive effect for mild versus moderate/severe sanctions, for sanctions aimed at improving the human rights situation, and for sanctions targeted against democracies.
The effect of sanctions targeted against democracies is quite intuitive. Improved emancipatory rights resulting from sanctions directed against democratic states might be because democratic governments are more accountable to the population and are more constrained in the sense that they are less able resort to violent measures and repression. Arguably, mild sanctions have a stronger positive influence because they typically entail sanction measures targeted against particular regime members and government officials and, thus, are more precision-guided and less blunt than severe sanctions. Finally, the positive impact of sanctions on emancipatory rights is somewhat larger during the first five years after imposition.
Conclusions
We use endogenous treatment-regression models to estimate the causal average treatment effect of US economic sanctions on four types of human rights; basic human rights, political rights and civil liberties, emancipatory rights, and economic rights. We explicitly take the endogeneity of the imposition of economic sanctions by the US into account by using instruments that are associated with the likelihood of becoming targeted by economic sanctions, but not directly with the outcome variables of interest.
Moreover, we account for potential heterogeneity across sanctioned countries and nonsanctioned countries by allowing the parameters of our empirical model to differ across both groups.
In contrast to previous studies, which ignore the endogeneity of economic sanctions, we find no support for adverse effects of sanctions on economic rights, political and civil rights, or basic human rights. With respect to women's rights, our findings even indicate a positive relationship. Emancipatory rights are, on average, strengthened when a country faces sanctions by the US. Our findings seem to hold independent of the choice of model specification or when differentiating between different types of economic sanctions. Most importantly, this study provides strong evidence that the endogeneity of treatment assignment must be modelled when the consequences of sanctions are studied empirically. Economic sanctions do not lead to a deterioration of the human rights situation in the targeted country, as indicated by the vast majority of empirical evidence. However, economic sanctions are also not associated with an improvement in basic human rights and political rights. This conclusion also holds for sanctions that are explicitly imposed with the aim of improving the human rights situation in the target country, which, arguably, is a dispiriting result. Neuenkirch and Neumeier (2015) .
Distance to US. Distance of the target country's capital from Washington, DC in 1,000 kilometers. Source: Gleditsch and Ward (2001) . 
